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In the course of the Warsaw Summit 
the Heads of State and Government 
of the Member States of the Council 
of Europe undertook to ensure that 
at the national level there are appropriate 
and effective mechanisms in all member 
states for verifying the compatibility of 
legislation and administrative practice 
with the European Convention on Human 
Rights (the Convention).1 
The two preconditions to the 
implementation of this obligation are 
the interpretation of national legislation 
(including the Constitution, if there 
is one in the domestic legal system 
concerned2) in accordance with the 
Convention, as well as the interpretation 
of the Convention by the national courts 
in accordance with the interpretation 
given by the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
The Convention itself does not oblige 
the contracting parties to make it part of 
their legal systems and, a fortiori, does 
not provide for a specific place for itself 
in the hierarchy of domestic norms. As 
the method in which each state party to 
the Convention has incorporated it into 
their domestic legal system has differed, 
the status of the Convention in domestic 
law varies from state to state, which 
accordingly influences its interpretation 
by the national courts. 
In Austria the Convention is a part of 
the Federal Constitution and Art. 10(2) 
of the Spanish Constitution imposes an 
obligation to interpret constitutional 
rights in accordance with international 
agreements on the matter. 
However, in other countries the 
situation is more complicated and 
interpreting constitutional rights in 
conformity with the Convention requires 
specific justification. Thus, in Germany, 
where the Convention is an ordinary 
federal law, the Federal Constitutional 
Court has held that in interpreting 
the Basic Law, the content and state of 
development of the Convention are also 
to be taken into consideration, insofar 
as this does not lead to a restriction or 
derogation of basic-rights protection 
under the Basic Law, an effect that even 
the Convention itself seeks to rule out.3 
In France the Convention has a 
place above ordinary laws, but below 
the Constitution in the domestic 
hierarchy of norms. Consequently, the 
Constitutional Council has held that 
it is not bound by the Convention and 
will not verify the conformity of laws 
with it.4 However, on several occasions 
it has read the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen of 1789 (which 
is a French constitutional instrument) in 
the same terms as the Strasbourg Court 
reads the relevant Convention articles. 
In particular, the French Constitutional 
Council has developed the constitutional 
principle of legal certainty with references 
to the Declaration of 1789, but the 
substance of the principle is the same as 
that found, for example, in the Sunday 
Times or Kruslin judgments.5 
In Russia, where the Convention has 
the same status as in France, although 
the Constitutional Court often makes 
reference to the Convention, the 
question whether it is bound by the 
European Court’s interpretation of 
the Convention, when interpreting 
constitutional rights, remains open. 
Article 17 of the Constitution, which 
provides that human rights should be 
guaranteed in accordance with the 
Constitution and universally accepted 
principles and norms of international 
law,6 makes no reference to international 
treaties. In I.V. Bogdanov and others7 the 
Constitutional Court reaffirmed that 
legislative provisions should be interpreted 
in accordance with the Convention and 
that judicial decisions must comply with 
it. Since the Constitutional Court made 
no reservations as to the types of judicial 
decisions that should comply with the 
Convention, it is possible to conclude 
that it is bound by the interpretation 
of the Convention by the European 
Court. However, this does not prevent 
the Constitutional Court from handing 
down decisions manifestly incompatible 
with the Convention.8 
It is the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation which has been more exigent 
in interpreting constitutional rights 
in conformity with the Convention. 
In its judgment in the case of Trade 
Union of Police of Moscow9 it read the 
constitutional prohibition of forced 
labour in the same sense as in Art. 4 of 
the Convention. 
In the author’s opinion the 
interpretation of constitutional rights in 
conformity with the Convention, which 
is now a matter of national judges’ will 
and the ‘dialogue of judges’ for the 
most part, should be grounded on the 
legal basis that since Constitutional and 
Convention rights are expressed in the 
same way, they should have the same 
interpretation. 
Nevertheless, national courts should 
go further to establish what is the 
correct manner of interpretation of the 
Convention. The rules to that effect 
provided by Section 2 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 are extremely helpful 
for domestic judges (not necessarily just 
in the United Kingdom, as they reflect 
the functioning of the Convention 
in general) in establishing the actual 
meaning of the Convention in the light 
of the Strasbourg Court’s case-law. 
According to section 2, judges should 
take into account any relevant judgment, 
decision or opinion of the European 
Court, report and admissibility decision 
of the former European Commission 
of Human Rights or decision of the 
Committee of Ministers on the merits 
of cases not referred to the Court under 
former Art. 46 of the Convention. 
This provision establishes a hierarchy 
of sources: thus, the judgments of the 
European Court carry greater weight 
than the decisions of the Commission. 
It also calls the domestic judges to take 
into account, that is, examine, case by 
case, the relevance of the Convention 
case-law as the Strasbourg judgments 
may be given on different facts or indeed 
whether the domestic courts should go 
further than the European Court in 
human rights protection relying on the 
‘living instrument’ doctrine.10 
In sum, it is submitted that the 
Convention may be effective in domestic 
legal orders when the courts interpret 
constitutional rights in accordance with 
the Convention and give the Convention 
the same sense as the European Court of 
Human Rights. If in finding a solution 
to the first issue every court should find 
the justification for the interpretation at 
issue from within its own constitutional 
system, the second issue is the same for 
every national court, so the rules on 
dealing with the Strasbourg case-law set 
out in the Human Rights Act 1998 may 
prove relevant outside the British Isles. 
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